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1I. INTRODUCTION
The study of incentives is one of the most important areas in accounting research. This
topic has received a considerable amount of attention from both the economics-based
literature and the behavioral-based literature. Although both literatures study the same type of
problem, though in different ways, there is almost no cross-fertilization (Merchant et al.
2000). This paper answers to the recent calls for more integration (e.g., Atkinson et al. 1997;
Merchant et al. 2000) and combines insights from the economics-based literature and the
behavioral-based literature to study the role of performance measure characteristics in the
design of incentive systems for subordinate managers.
In this paper, I derive three general performance measure characteristics from the
literature that are theoretically related to the use of performance measures, i.e., (1) the impact
that a manager has on performance (sensitivity), (2) the impact that uncontrollable factors
have on performance (controllability), and (3) the degree to which the performance measure is
objective and verifiable (measurement accuracy). I empirically examine the effect of
information asymmetry and the performance measure characteristics on the use of three types
of performance measures: (1) financial, (2) internal non-financial, and (3) external non-
financial. Furthermore, I examine how two types of uncertainty, i.e., task uncertainty and
environmental uncertainty, affect the performance measure characteristics.
There are three reasons for focusing on information asymmetry, performance measure
characteristics and uncertainty. First, the type of incentives used depends on the level of
information asymmetry, where increased information asymmetry increases the need for output
measurement, which is the focus of this paper. Second, performance measure characteristics,
such as sensitivity and controllability, underlie most predictions in incentive studies in
accounting. Although the theoretical predictions are based on performance measure
characteristics, no structured attempt has been made so far to actually incorporate these
2characteristics in empirical research. Third, uncertainty is the core concept upon which
organizational design frameworks are based (Galbraith 1977). Hartmann (2000) states that
uncertainty is the underlying variable of most empirical studies investigating the use and
effects of financial performance measures. Furthermore, he states that the effects of
uncertainty are not well-understood (Hartmann 2000, 471).
The empirical results show that sensitivity is positively related to the use of all three
types of performance measures, while measurement accuracy is positively related to the use
of financial and internal non-financial performance measures. Controllability, on the other
hand, does not have the proposed positive effect on any of the performance measures. These
results suggest that sensitivity and measurement accuracy play an important role in designing
incentive systems, while controllability seems to play no role. The empirical results further
indicate that decision-making authority, as a proxy for information asymmetry, is only
positively related to the use of financial performance measures. Regarding the effect of
uncertainty, the results show that task uncertainty increases the sensitivity of financial and
internal non-financial performance measures, but is not related to the sensitivity of external
non-financial performance measures. Finally, environmental uncertainty decreases the
controllability of all three types of performance measures.
This paper contributes to the literature in four ways. First, it attempts to measure
performance measure characteristics and empirically examine how these affect the use of
performance measures. Second, this study simultaneously investigates the use of performance
measure of both a financial and non-financial nature. Third, it examines how different types
of uncertainty affect the characteristics of performance measures. Finally, it integrates
findings from both the economics-based literature and the behavioral-based literature to
provide a more complete analysis.
3The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section II presents the theoretical
analysis and the development of hypotheses. Section III describes the sample selection and
data collection. The empirical results are discussed in Section IV. Finally, Section V provides
a summary and conclusion.
II. THEORY AND HYPOTHESIS DEVELOPMENT
Both the economics-based literature and the behavioral-based literature either
explicitly or implicitly state that performance measure characteristics should explain the use
of performance measures and that performance measures should be used when behavior
cannot be observed or measured. In this paper, I focus on three types of performance
measures: (1) financial performance measures, (2) internal non-financial performance
measures, and (3) external non-financial performance measures. This classification is partly
based on the literature (e.g., Larcker 1981; Gordon and Narayanan 1984; Ittner et al. 1997)
and partly on the interviews with human resource managers of the firms participating in this
study. First, the financial performance measures are defined as the ‘traditional’ financial
performance measures, such as return-on-assets, net income, and cash flows.1 Second, the
internal non-financial performance measures consist of performance measures that are
directly related to the tasks performed. Examples of these performance measures are
productivity, efficiency, and successful implementation of projects. Finally, the external non-
financial performance measures are defined as those performance measures that reflect
performance in the market. Examples of these performance measures are market share,
market growth, and customer satisfaction.
Information asymmetry (decision-making authority)
The reason why firm design compensation contracts based on performance measures
instead of on managerial actions is because managerial actions cannot be observed, they are
too costly to observe, or because superiors cannot interpret what they are observing. This
4information asymmetry due to the ‘unobservability’ of managerial actions increases the need
for performance measures. Information asymmetry occurs when decision rights are allocated
downward in the organization, i.e., decision-making authority is decentralized. This increase
in decision-making authority creates a need to evaluate the outcomes of the decisions made
lower in the organization. Decision-making authority, as a proxy for information asymmetry,
will therefore lead to demand for performance measurement and the use of any feasible
performance measures available. However, increased decision-making authority also
increases the demand for more aggregate information (Chenhall and Morris 1986). Providing
managers with more decision-making authority means that managers will take more actions,
which results in increases in information asymmetry. Since it is too costly to have
performance measures for each type of action (Banker and Datar 1989; Ittner and Larcker
1999), there exists an increased preference for more aggregate performance measures, i.e.,
performance measures that provide (some) information about an increased ‘number’ of
actions. Financial performance measures are more aggregate than both internal and external
non-financial performance measures, since the outcomes of all actions finally need to end up
in the financial results. This means the usefulness of financial performance measures
increases, while the usefulness of the non-financial performance measures decreases as
decision-making authority increases. As a result, information asymmetry has a differential
effect on the use of the three types of performance measures. The existence of information
asymmetry due to the allocation of decision rights has a positive effect on the use of all three
types of performance measures, while the need for aggregation due to increased information
asymmetry has a positive effect on the use of financial performance measures and a negative
effect on the use of internal and external non-financial performance measures. Because it is
unclear a priori whether the ‘information asymmetry aspect’ or the ‘aggregation aspect’ will
5dominate, no directional hypotheses can be stated with respect to the non-financial
performance measures. The above arguments lead to hypotheses 1a-1c.
H1a: Decision-making authority increases the use of financial performance
measures.
H1b: Decision-making authority is not related to the use of internal non-financial
performance measures.
H1c: Decision-making authority is not related to the use of external non-financial
performance measures.
Performance measure characteristics
Previous studies have used a multitude of performance measure characteristics in
developing hypotheses. Most of the economics-based empirical research (e.g., Lambert and
Larcker 1987; Sloan 1993) has been founded on the informativeness principle of Holmström
(1979) and the extensions made in the accounting literature by Banker and Datar (1989) and
Feltham and Xie (1994). Holmström (1979) finds that any performance measure that is
available at no cost should be used for incentive purposes if it is informative. That is, if a
performance measure provides (incremental) information about the decisions made by the
manager, it should be used in the evaluation of that manager. Although Holmström’s finding
gives an indication of what performance measures should be used, it does not provide an
answer to the question of how much weight to put on each performance measure. Banker and
Datar (1989) extend the results by Holmström and analytically show that the weight put on a
performance measure depends on the sensitivity and noise of the performance measure.
Sensitivity is formally defined as the marginal contribution of the manager’s actions to the
expected outcome of a performance measure. Noise, on the other hand, is formally defined as
the variance in the actual outcome of the performance measure due to ‘random events’.
Obviously, these characteristics have a specific meaning in principal-agent models. However,
6intuitively sensitivity relates to the degree to which a manager’s decisions have an impact on
performance, while noise relates to the degree to which uncontrollable factors have an impact
on performance. Ceteris paribus, the greater the sensitivity, the more weight is put on the
performance measure, while the greater the noise, the less weight is put on the performance
measure.
Feltham and Xie (1994) use an agency model that incorporates an additional problem
in choosing performance measures, i.e., performance measure congruence. Their results
indicate that incorporating more congruent performance measures has economic value.
However, as congruence is not a single parameter in their model, it is unclear how congruence
affects the weight put on a performance measure.
In contrast to the economics-based empirical research, most of the behavioral-based
empirical research is based on the controllability principle (e.g., Govindarajan 1984;
Govindarajan and Gupta 1985). The controllability principle states that managers should only
be held responsible for things they can control (Merchant 1989). That is, the manager should
not be held responsible for the impact of uncontrollable factors on performance. The greater
the impact of the uncontrollable factors the lower the controllability and the less emphasis is
put on that particular performance measure. Although noise is specifically defined in
principal-agent models, the intuitive interpretation is identical to that of controllability and
both are sometimes even used as synonyms (see e.g., Merchant 1989, 87).
In an extensive field study, Merchant (1989) finds that the controllability principle is
not strictly applied in practice. He concludes that the most important factor explaining the use
of performance measures is the degree of influence the manager has (Merchant 1989, 106).
That is, if the manager’s decisions have an impact on the outcome of the performance
measure, then that performance measure will be used for incentive purposes. These results are
consistent with the more intuitive interpretation of sensitivity described in the principal-agent
7models. It further suggests that sensitivity and noise/controllability are two separate
performance measure characteristics.
Finally, Merchant (1989) identifies a performance measure characteristic that has
received almost no attention in the empirical literature, i.e., measurement accuracy.
Measurement accuracy consists of two components: verifiability and objectivity. Verifiability
means that the measures can be ‘substantially duplicated by independent measurers using the
same measurement methods’ (Merchant 1989, 26), i.e., the measurement dispersion is small.
Objectivity, on the other hand, means that the measurement is ‘free from personal bias’
(Merchant 1989, 26). Inaccurate performance measures make it more difficult to elicit the
manager’s performance from the measure and should therefore be used less. Notice that this
prediction is identical to that with respect to the impact of uncontrollable factors. However,
there is a conceptual difference between accuracy and noise or controllability in the sense that
the first is due to the measurement process, while the second is due to factors affecting the
day-to-day operations.
Although all of the performance measure characteristics described above are different
in a strict sense, there are some important similarities. In general, a distinction can be made
between (1) the impact that a manager has on performance, (2) the impact that uncontrollable
factors have on performance, and (3) the degree to which the performance measure is
objective and verifiable. This implies that if we move beyond strict definitions, the different
characteristics reflect three general performance measure characteristics, which I label (1)
sensitivity, (2) controllability, and (3) measurement accuracy.
Following the economics-based literature and the behavioral-based literature, I predict
that the use of performance measures depends on the performance measures’ characteristics.
More specifically, sensitivity, controllability, and measurement accuracy have a positive
8effect on the use of performance measures. These predictions are summarized in hypotheses
2a-2c.
H2a: the use of financial performance measures increases with their (i) sensitivity,
(ii) controllability, and (iii) measurement accuracy.
H2b: the use of internal non-financial performance measures increases with their (i)
sensitivity, (ii) controllability, and (ii) measurement accuracy.
H2c: the use of external non-financial performance measures increases with their (i)
sensitivity, (ii) controllability, and (ii) measurement accuracy.
Uncertainty
Uncertainty is one of the most important variables in organizational design
frameworks and it is also the dominant concept in performance evaluation and compensation
research. The literature makes a distinction between two types of uncertainty based on its
source, i.e., environmental uncertainty and task uncertainty (e.g., Fisher 1995; Hartmann
2000). Environmental uncertainty is defined as the uncertainty due to factors in the
organization’s environment, while task uncertainty is defined as the uncertainty due to the
complexity and diversity of the task performed. These constructs have predominantly been
used in the behavioral-based literature, although related constructs are available in the
economics-based literature (Ittner and Larcker 2000). The general assumption made in the
literature is that both environmental uncertainty and task uncertainty negatively affect the
usefulness of financial performance measures because both types of uncertainty decrease the
controllability of these measures. However, there are two problems with this assumption. First
of all, empirical research has not always made a distinction between environmental
uncertainty and task uncertainty (Hartmann 2000) and it is not at all clear if both types of
uncertainty affect the controllability of financial performance measures. Second, an implicit
assumption underlying this stream of research is that the two types of uncertainty have no
9effect or a positive effect on alternative performance measures. Below, I argue that the two
types of uncertainty have an effect on different situational characteristics of financial
performance measures and that these effects also partly apply to non-financial performance
measures. I first discuss the effect of task uncertainty on sensitivity and subsequently the
effect of environmental uncertainty on controllability.
Task uncertainty is a job characteristic that reflects the complexity and diversity of the
task performed. The RAPM literature has assumed that high task uncertainty situations are, in
part, characterized by an increase in the performance impact of factors beyond the control of
the manager, which decreases the usefulness of (accounting) performance measures.
However, I propose that this interpretation of task uncertainty is incorrect and mainly due to
the literature’s inability to clearly distinguish between different types of uncertainty
(Hartmann 2000).2 Increased task uncertainty indicates more uncertainty about the way in
which a certain objective should be achieved. This does not mean that ‘other factors’ have
more influence on performance, but rather that the actions chosen by managers are crucial to
task performance. Locke and Latham (1990, p. 260) state that:
‘…in more complex tasks, the plans, tactics, and strategies used by the individual play
a larger role in task performance than they do in simpler tasks where the number of
different strategies is more limited and are generally known to all performers.’
Lambert and Larcker (1995) make similar arguments in a study examining compensation
contracts for senior-level hospital administrators. They state that:
‘Hospitals with complex service offerings to the patient are inherently more difficult to
manage. As a result, the profitability of these hospitals is more sensitive to the amount
of effort provided by the hospital administrator’ (emphasis added).
Thus, in more complex and diverse tasks, the manager’s decisions are of greater importance
to task performance. However, the degree to which task uncertainty increases the ability of
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managers to improve performance, i.e., increase sensitivity, depends on what measure of
performance is used. If the performance measure is internal oriented and related to the task,
the time-span between providing effort and observing performance becomes shorter, which
increases the ability of managers to see how their efforts translate into performance. Related
to this issue is that the ability of managers to improve performance is increased by the amount
of feedback they receive. Feedback information facilitates learning and allows managers to
update their strategies, which makes performance more effort-sensitive (Sprinkle 2000). As a
result, task uncertainty increases the sensitivity of those performance measures that are
internal oriented and for which feedback can be provided on a frequent basis. The conditions
of internal orientation and provision of frequent feedback are present in the internal non-
financial performance measures and to a lesser extent also in the financial performance
measures, but are absent in the external non-financial performance measures. Therefore, task
uncertainty increases the sensitivity of both financial and internal non-financial performance
measures, but is not related to the sensitivity of external non-financial performance measures.
These predictions are summarized in hypotheses 3a-3c.
H3a: task uncertainty increases the sensitivity of financial performance measures.
H3b: task uncertainty increases the sensitivity of internal non-financial performance
measures.
H3c: task uncertainty is not related to the sensitivity of external non-financial
performance measures.
As already stated above, environmental uncertainty is assumed to decrease the
usefulness of financial performance measures because it decreases the controllability of these
measures. Environmental uncertainty increases the unpredictable impact of uncontrollable
factors on performance, which makes it more difficult to judge ex-post whether good or bad
financial performance is due to changing environmental conditions or due to managerial
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performance. Although this argument seems to be valid, there is no reason to assume that this
relationship only applies to financial performance measures. It is very likely that this
relationship also applies to the internal and external non-financial performance measures. For
example, unpredictable changes in customers’ behavior can have an uncontrollable impact on
the degree to which these customers are satisfied with the firm’s products and services, which
might consequently affect market share. In a similar vein, technological developments and
changes in suppliers’ behavior can have an uncontrollable impact on the efficiency and
effectiveness of the task performed. As a result, internal and external non-financial
performance measures contain the same defects as financial performance measures in the
sense that increased environmental uncertainty decreases the controllability of these
performance measures. These predictions are summarized in hypotheses 4a-4c.
H4a: environmental uncertainty decreases the controllability of financial
performance measures.
H4b: environmental uncertainty decreases the controllability of internal non-
financial performance measures.
H4c: environmental uncertainty decreases the controllability of external non-
financial performance measures.
III. RESEARCH METHOD
To test the hypotheses developed in the previous section, I gathered data from multiple
sources. The data sources used consist of interviews, questionnaires and proprietary archival
data. Survey data are available for 114 managers employed in 6 firms, while proprietary data
are available for 96 managers employed in 5 firms. This section presents details on the sample
selection and data collection.
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Sample of firms
This paper focuses on the use of performance measures in the evaluation and
compensation of managers. That is, rather than explaining why firms use incentive systems,
this paper addresses which performance measures are used given the firm’s trade-off to use an
incentive system. As a result, eligible firms must have an incentive system in place, which
renders random sampling inappropriate. In order to select the firms of interest, I used the
following procedure. I contacted Hay Management Consultants (HMC) and explained the
research question of this study. HMC provided a list of clients that were eligible for this
study, which contained the name of the firm, name of the Human Resource Manager, firm
address, and telephone number.
I called the Human Resource (HR) Managers of fifty firms to explain the research
study and solicit their participation. Participation, at first, meant giving an interview. Out of
the fifty firms, fifteen (30%) agreed to an interview. Noteworthy is that the majority of the
firms (17) that did not agree to participate were firms that were currently implementing a new
or ‘updated’ variable compensation system, which they characterized as ‘politically sensitive’.
Other reasons for non-participation were time constraints (11), reorganizations (5), and
mergers (2).
The interview with the HR managers served two purposes. First, the interview was
used to get a better understanding of the performance evaluation and compensation system in
place. It was important to examine if performance evaluation and compensation were an issue
and to what extent variable compensation was important. This facilitated a more specific
selection of firms relevant to this study. Second, the interview was used to ask the HR
manager to support the research and to be its ‘champion’ within the firm.
During the interviews, the content of participation was discussed in more depth. I
explained that participation implied (1) the selection of respondents, (2) the distribution of
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questionnaires by internal mail, (3) the attachment of a letter of endorsement by the HR
manager or a higher-level official, (4) administrative support for follow-up procedures, and
(5) the provision of a detailed description of the respondent’s annual bonus plan. Of the
fifteen firms interviewed, six declined further collaboration. The reasons why these firms did
not participate were that they did not allow me to go ‘into the firm’ (4 firms) or that they did
not have an annual bonus system (2 firms). Of the nine firms that agreed to participate, three
requested a more tailor-made study. To assure uniformity of the research design, I decided to
design a separate study for each of these firms and to exclude them from the current study.3
As a result, the final sample consists of six firms. Descriptive statistics are provided in Table
1.
------------
Insert Table 1 about here
------------
Sample of respondents
After the firms agreed to participate in the study, the HR manager of each firm
selected the sample of respondents. In making the selection, the HR managers were given
three criteria on which they should base their selection. First, the respondents should have
managerial responsibilities, either as head of a functional department or as head of a division,
business unit or something similar. To assure a minimum level of managerial responsibilities,
the respondent’s job design should have a weight greater than 400 Hay-points.4 Second, the
respondent should have an annual bonus plan. Finally, the respondent should have
experienced at least one annual performance evaluation cycle.
The HR managers were asked to select as many respondents as possible within the
above four constraints. The selection by the HR managers resulted in 202 managers that were
asked to participate in the study.
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Questionnaire design
To maximize the response rate, I designed the questionnaire according to the
guidelines of Dillman’s (1978) Total Design Method. I pre-tested the questionnaire with seven
academics and all six HR managers, which resulted in minor revisions of the questionnaire.
Furthermore, I administered a follow-up by telephone and mail. Of the 202 questionnaires that
were distributed, 114 were returned. This corresponds to an overall response rate of 56%. This
response rate is satisfactory and comparable to the response rates reported in previous
accounting studies. Of the 114 questionnaires returned, nine have missing data. Because I use
bootstrapped coefficient estimates and standard errors to calculate significance levels (Noreen
1989; Mooney and Duval 1993), I delete the nine questionnaires with missing data listwise.
As the response rate is not 100%, though satisfactory, I conduct a test for non-response
bias. I split the sample at the firm-specific median response time and calculate a t-test for
differences in means for each of the variables of interest to this study. The results indicate that
there are no significant differences between early and late respondents for any of the
variables. This suggests the absence of non-response bias.
Proprietary archival data
Five firms provided archival data with respect to the annual bonus contract of the
respondents, which were used to validate the survey-based measures of performance measure
use. Four firms have uniform contracts for their managers with respect to the relative use of
financial versus non-financial performance measures, although the number of performance
measures in each category can vary between managers. However, I have no data with respect
to the number of performance measures for each of the respondents in these four firms. One
firm has manager-specific contracts, which were provided to me.5 As a result, archival data
are available for 96 managers in five firms. After listwise deletion of the nine questionnaires
with missing data, survey and proprietary data are available for 87 managers.
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Measurement instruments
The measurement instruments used in the questionnaire are either taken from previous
accounting studies or are newly developed. More specifically, the instruments used to
measure decision-making authority, task uncertainty, and environmental uncertainty are taken
from previous accounting studies, while the instruments used to measure the performance
measure characteristics and performance measure use are newly developed.
Since the data are obtained through questionnaires, all measures are perceptual
measures. That is, each measure reflects the individual respondent’s perception of the variable
in question. As a result, the responses are individual-specific, not firm-specific. Although, I
do not specifically label each variable, for example, perceived decision-making authority or
perceived task uncertainty, it should be kept in mind that all variables are in fact perceptions.
Decision-making authority. I measure decision-making authority by taking the scale
used by Gordon and Narayanan (1984). The instruments asks the respondents to indicate the
extent to which they have decision-making authority with respect to (1) development of new
products and services, (2) hiring and firing of personnel, (3) selection of large investments, (4)
budget allocations, and (5) pricing decisions. A five-point fully anchored scale is used to
indicate the level of authority. Confirmatory factor analysis shows that all five items load
significantly on the latent variable decision-making authority. I compute the decision-making
authority construct by summing and averaging the standardized scores of the five items.6
Performance measure characteristics. To date no attempt has been made to measure
the characteristics of performance measures. In order to measure the performance measure
characteristics, I therefore develop new constructs. The survey questionnaire contains, for
each type of performance measure, 15 statements concerning the performance measure
characteristics. A five-point fully anchored scale is used to indicate the level of agreement
with these statements. The 15 statements, listed in Table 2, are based on the literature with
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respect to the controllability principle (e.g., Merchant 1989) and the principal-agent model
and are designed to measure the constructs sensitivity, controllability, and measurement
accuracy. The statements relate to the extent to which each type of performance measure is
influenced by (1) the manager’s actions and (2) factors outside the control of the manager, as
well as the extent to which the measure is objective and verifiable. A priori it is expected that
items a.-e. will measure controllability, f.-k. sensitivity, and l.-o. measurement accuracy.
------------
Insert Table 2 about here
------------
Principal component analysis with oblique rotation reveals four factors with
eigenvalues greater than 1, explaining 59% of the total variance. Table 2 shows how each of
the 15 items load on the four factors. The results indicate that there are three ‘independent’
constructs, i.e., factor 1-3, while factor 4 seems to be a mixture of factor 1 and 3. Examining
the items loading on factors 1-3 reveals that the items loading on factor 1 relate to the impact
the manager has on performance, while the items loading on factor 2 and 3 relate to
respectively the objectivity and verifiability of the measure and the impact of uncontrollable
factors. In general, the principal component analysis seems to be consistent with the
expectation that the 15 items contain the constructs sensitivity (factor 1), controllability
(factor 3), and measurement accuracy (factor 2). The only item that does not load on one of
the first three factors is item g. An explanation for this finding might be that this item is
reverse coded.
I measure the constructs sensitivity, controllability, and measurement accuracy by
summing and averaging, for each type of performance measure separately, the standardized
scores of the items that relate to respectively factor 1, factor 3, and factor 2.
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Task uncertainty. I construct the task uncertainty variable by taking the instrument
developed by Withey et al. (1983), which contains nine statements with respect to the
analyzability (complexity) and variability (diversity) of the respondent’s tasks. A five-point
fully anchored scale is used to indicate the level of agreement with each of these nine
statements. Confirmatory factor analysis indicates that all nine items load significantly on the
latent variable, although three items have low factor loadings. A principal component analysis
with oblique rotation reveals an indication of multi-dimensionality. However, the factors
identified do not correspond to the dimensions of analyzability and variability that are
sometimes seen as important independent factors (see e.g., Brownell and Hirst 1986). Since
the principal component analysis does not reveal clear independent factors and all items load
significantly on the latent variable, I compute task uncertainty by summing and averaging the
standardized scores of the nine items.
Environmental uncertainty. The environmental uncertainty variable is derived from
the scales used by Govindarajan (1984) and Merchant (1990) and consists of five attributes
with respect to the respondent’s work environment. The five attributes relate to the behavior
of (1) customers, (2) competitors, and (3) suppliers, as well as (4) technological developments
and (5) political and/or legal changes. Ten items are used to indicate to what extent each of
these five attributes are predictable and have on impact on the work and performance of the
respondents. A six-point fully anchored scale is used, which consists of a five-point scale to
indicate the extent of predictability and impact and an additional option that can be used to
indicate that the specific factor is not part of the respondent’s environment.
Similar to the way in which Khandwalla (1972) and Libby and Waterhouse (1996)
measure competition, I compute the environmental uncertainty variable by multiplying, for
each attribute, the ratings on impact by predictability and taking the square root of the
product.7 Confirmatory factor analysis indicates that all but one product term load
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significantly on the latent variable. The attribute ‘political and/or legal changes’ does not
load on the above construct and is therefore deleted from the measurement instrument. As a
result, I measure environmental uncertainty by summing and averaging the standardized
scores of the remaining four attributes.
Performance measure use. The extent to which each type of performance measure is
used in the evaluation and compensation of the managers is measured using eight items.
These items, shown in Table 3, relate to the use of each type of performance measure for (1)
evaluation purposes, (2) monetary compensation, and (3) non-monetary rewards. A five-point
fully anchored scale is used to indicate the importance of each type of performance measure
for performance evaluation and compensation purposes. Principal component analysis reveals
one factor with an eigenvalue greater than one, explaining 58% of the total variance. I
compute the construct performance measure use by summing and averaging the standardized
scores of the eight items for each type of performance measure.
------------
Insert Table 3 about here
------------
To test whether these survey-based constructs of performance measure use are
consistent with the relative reliance on financial performance measures (%FPM) stated in the
annual bonus contract, I split the sample into two groups of approximately equal size based on
the median reported %FPM. For each sub-sample, I compare the use of financial performance
measures with the use of the two non-financial performance measures using a paired-sample
t-test.
The results, shown in Table 4, indicate that for the ‘low-%FPM’ sub-sample the use of
financial performance measures is indeed significantly lower than the use of the non-financial
performance measures (one-tail p<0.01). For the ‘high-%FPM’ sub-sample the use of
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financial performance measures is significantly higher than the use of the non-financial
performance measures (one-tail p<0.01). Further, for both sub-samples there is no significant
difference between the use of the two non-financial performance measures. These results
provide some evidence that the survey-based measures are consistent with the weights stated
in the annual bonus contract.
------------
Insert Table 4 about here
------------
Previously, I stated that four firms have uniform annual bonus contracts with respect
to the relative use of financial versus non-financial performance measures, although the
number of performance measures in each category can vary between managers. To test
whether respondents within each firm report firm-specific incentives, i.e., corporate policy,
rather than individual-specific incentives, I examine the distribution of responses within each
of these four firms. The results show that, although the mean response is consistent with
corporate policy, there is no clustering of responses and there is significant variation in
responses within each firm. These results suggest that the firms in question create individual-
specific incentives and that the respondents report these individual-specific incentives.
Descriptive statistics for all variables are provided in Table 5
------------
Insert Table 5 about here
------------
IV. EMPIRICAL RESULTS
The hypotheses stated in section II are tested by estimating the empirical model
presented in Figure 1 using Amos 4.0.8 Because of sample size limitations, I estimate the
empirical model for each type of performance measure separately. Furthermore, I treat all
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variables in the model as observed variables rather than latent variables. The significance
levels reported in this section are based on bootstrapping (Noreen 1989; Mooney and Duval
1993).9
------------
Insert Figure 1 about here
------------
For presentation purposes, I discuss the empirical results by hypothesis. The empirical
results with respect to the factors explaining the use of performance measures, i.e., hypotheses
1-2, are presented in Table 6.
Hypotheses 1a-1c
Hypothesis 1a predicts that decision-making authority has a positive effect on the use
of financial performance measures. The empirical results, shown in Table 6, indicate that
decision-making authority is positively related to the use of financial performance measures
(one-tail p<0.05), which provides support for hypothesis 1a. The effect of decision-making
authority on the use of internal and external non-financial performance measures is unknown
a priori, as reflected by the null-hypotheses 1b and 1c. The empirical results show that
decision-making authority does not affect the use of either internal or external non-financial
performance measures. Therefore, hypotheses 1b and 1c are supported.
------------
Insert Table 6 about here
------------
Hypotheses 2a(i)-2c(i)
The performance measure characteristic sensitivity is hypothesized to have a positive
effect on the use of the three types of performance measures. The empirical results show that
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sensitivity is positively related to the use of all three types of performance measures (one-tail
p<0.01) and therefore provide strong support for hypotheses 2a(i), 2b(i), and 2c(i).
Hypotheses 2a(ii)-2c(ii)
Hypotheses 2a(ii)-2c(ii) state that the use of performance measures increases with its
controllability, as predicted by the controllability principle. Table 6, however, indicates that
these hypotheses are not supported by the data. The empirical results show that controllability
is not related to the use of internal and external non-financial performance measures, while it
is negatively related to the use of financial performance measures. This last finding is actually
contrary to my expectations and I discuss some plausible explanations in the final chapter.
Hypotheses 2a(iii)-2c(iii)
The last performance measure characteristic that is expected to positively affect the
use of the three types of performance measures is measurement accuracy. The empirical
results show that measurement accuracy is positively related to the use of financial and
internal non-financial performance measures (one-tail p<0.05) but not related to the use of
external non-financial performance measures. As a result, hypotheses 2a(iii) and 2b(iii) are
supported, while hypothesis 2c(iii) is not supported by the data.
------------
Insert Table 7 about here
------------
Hypotheses 3a-3c
The empirical results with respect to the effect of task uncertainty on the sensitivity of
the three types of performance measures are summarized in Table 7. The results provide
strong support for hypotheses 3a-3c. That is, task uncertainty increases the sensitivity of
financial performance measures (one-tail p<0.025) and internal non-financial performance
measures (one-tail p<0.01) but it does not affect the sensitivity of external non-financial
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performance measures. Therefore, financial and internal non-financial performance measures
become more useful as task uncertainty increases.
Hypotheses 4a-4c
Finally, hypotheses 4a-4c predict that the level of environmental uncertainty
negatively affects the controllability of the three types of performance measures. The
empirical results, presented in Table 8, provide strong support for these hypotheses. The
analysis shows that environmental uncertainty is negatively related to the controllability of all
three types of performance measures (one-tail p<0.01). That is, the controllability decreases as
environmental uncertainty increases.
------------
Insert Table 8 about here
------------
In summary, the empirical results first indicate that decision-making authority is
positively related to the use of financial performance measures but not related to the use of the
non-financial performance measures. Therefore hypotheses 1a-1c are supported. Second,
sensitivity and measurement accuracy are the most important performance measure
characteristics, with sensitivity being related to the use of all three types of performance
measures and measurement accuracy being related to the use of financial and internal non-
financial performance measures. The performance measure characteristic controllability, on
the other hand, does not have the proposed positive effect on performance measure use. The
only relationship that is significant shows an opposite effect, indicating that the use of
financial performance measures is negatively related to their controllability. As a result,
hypotheses 2ai, 2aiii, 2bi, 2biii, and 2ci are supported and hypotheses 2aii, 2bii, 2cii, and 2ciii are
not supported. Third, the results also provide evidence that task uncertainty increases the
sensitivity of financial and internal non-financial performance measures, but is not related to
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the sensitivity of external non-financial performance measures. Therefore, hypotheses 3a-3c
are supported, which suggests that the usefulness of financial and internal non-financial
performance measures increases with task uncertainty. Finally, the controllability of all three
types of performance measures decreases with increased environmental uncertainty, which
lends support for hypotheses 4a-4c. That is, the non-financial performance measures contain
the same defects as the financial performance measures when environmental uncertainty is
high. The results of the hypothesis testing are summarized in Table 9.
------------
Insert Table 9 about here
------------
Sensitivity analysis and additional tests
In the empirical analysis, I implicitly tested the prediction that uncertainty has an
indirect effect, rather than a direct effect, on the use of performance measures. Simple
correlation analysis shows that environmental uncertainty and the use of financial
performance measures are positively related (one-tail p<0.01) and that task uncertainty and
the use of internal non-financial performance measures are positively related (one-tail
p<0.025). To examine whether the relationship between the performance measure
characteristics and the use of performance measures are due to the omission of the direct
effect of uncertainty, I perform two tests.10 First, I incorporate the direct effects of
environmental uncertainty and task uncertainty into the empirical model in Figure 1 with
respect to the two types of performance measures. For both models, the direct effects of both
types of uncertainty are not significant, while all other relationships are identical to those
presented in the previous section. Second, I test whether the indirect model or the direct
model, which is nested in the indirect model, has a better fit to the data. By constraining the
relevant relationships to zero, I calculate the chi-square difference statistic between both
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models for the financial and internal non-financial performance measures. The chi-square
difference statistics with respect to financial and internal non-financial performance measures
are respectively 32.33 and 43.13 (for all p<0.01), which indicates that for both types of
performance measures the indirect model has a better fit to the data. As a result, the
relationship between the performance measure characteristics and the use of performance
measures is not due to the omission of a direct effect of uncertainty.
According to economic theory, organizations should simultaneously select
organizational design variables, such as decision-making authority and the use of performance
measures (e.g., Milgrom and Roberts 1995; Brickley et al. 1997). To examine whether
decision-making authority and the use of performance measures are simultaneously
determined, I estimate for each type of performance measure the non-recursive model
presented in Figure 2. To allow the model to be estimated, the model includes, in addition to
the hypotheses stated previously and the non-recursive nature, the relationship between
environmental uncertainty and decision-making authority. Simple correlation analysis shows
that environmental uncertainty and decision-making authority are positively related (one-tail
p<0.05).11
------------
Insert Figure 2 about here
------------
The results related to the use of the non-financial performance measures indicate that
decision-making authority has no effect on performance measure use and vice versa. The
model with respect to the use of financial performance measures is not stable, implying that
the empirical model is misspecified. From these results, I conclude that there is no evidence
that decision-making authority and the use of performance measures are simultaneously
determined, which is consistent with Nagar (1999).
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Finally, I split the model, presented in Figure 1, into two parts, i.e., (1) hypotheses 1a-
2c and (2) hypotheses 3a-4c, and estimate each part for all three performance measures
simultaneously. In testing hypotheses 1a-2c, I allow the performance measures to be
simultaneously determined. The results from these additional tests are qualitatively similar to
those presented in Tables 6-8.
V. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION
This paper examines the role of performance measure characteristics in the design of
incentive systems for subordinate managers. I find that environmental uncertainty decreases
the controllability of financial performance measures, a relationship traditionally assumed in
the literature. However, I further find that environmental uncertainty also decreases the
controllability of internal non-financial and external non-financial performance measures.
This indicates that the assumed defects of financial performance measures also apply to the
non-financial performance measures. Interestingly, the degree of controllability does not have
the proposed positive effect on the use of the three types of performance measures.
Controllability of financial performance measures is negatively related to the use of these
measures for incentive purposes. A plausible explanation for this relationship might be that
the uncontrollables are a consequence of the manager’s actions and are therefore informative.
Another plausible explanation might be that superiors want their managers to be aware of the
uncontrollables and take these into account when making decisions. However, I also find that
controllability is not related to the use of the two non-financial performance measures, which
cannot be explained by the above two reasons.
Further, the empirical findings indicate that, consistent with my expectations, the level
of decision-making authority increases the use of financial performance measures and is not
related to the use of the two non-financial performance measures.
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The degree to which the performance measures are measured in an accurate way
seems to play a role in using performance measures for incentive purposes. I find that
increased measurement accuracy increases the use of financial and internal non-financial
performance measures. These results indicate that ‘noise’ due to the measurement process is
relatively more important for using performance measures than ‘noise’ due to uncontrollable
factors (controllability). A possible explanation for this finding might be that it is less costly
for the firm to adjust for the extent to which they accurately measure performance than it is to
adjust for uncontrollables. The fact that measurement accuracy does not affect the use of
external non-financial performance measures, which are often measured by third parties,
provides some evidence for this explanation.
The most important performance measure characteristic related to the use of
performance measures is sensitivity. All three types of performance measures are affected by
the extent to which the manager can influence them. These results provide strong evidence of
the use of the informativeness principle by firms. That is, rather than using performance
measures that are totally controllable (controllability principle), firms seem to choose
performance measures that provide information about the manager’s actions, even if these are
partly uncontrollable (cf. Merchant 1989). In contrast to the behavioral-based literature, which
generally states that the usefulness of financial performance measures decreases with
increased task uncertainty, I find that task uncertainty increases the usefulness of financial and
internal non-financial performance measures because it increases their sensitivity.
The results presented in this paper provide some directions for future research. First,
the finding that controllability is not positively related to the use of performance measures
deserves some additional attention. The accounting literature stresses the importance of the
controllability principle and identifies the costs that are associated with the use of
uncontrollable performance measures. However, if firms make efficient choices on average,
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then there must be increased benefits of not adjusting for the effects of uncontrollable factors.
This is particularly interesting since the results indicate that ‘noise’ due to the measurement
process does affect the use of performance measures for incentive purposes. Future research
should address the costs and benefits associated with the adjustments made with respect to
‘noise’ due to the measurement process and ‘noise’ due to the effect of uncontrollable factors.
Second, in this study, I examine the effect of the performance measure characteristics
sensitivity, controllability, and measurement accuracy. Although these characteristics
dominate the theoretical literature, it is unlikely that these are the only (theoretically) relevant
performance measure characteristics. One opportunity for future research is to identify
additional characteristics that play a role in designing incentive systems and to examine how
these characteristics change with specific contextual factors.
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TABLE 1
Descriptive statistics of participating firms
Firm Activity # of employees
A Provision of financial services 1,690
B Trade of machinery and provision of
technical services
12,207
C Provision of life and indemnity insurance 1,275
D Trade of pharmaceutical products 401
E Production of food products 7,482
F Financial leasing 354
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TABLE 2
Principal component analysis with oblique rotation of the 15 items related to the performance measure characteristics
(1) sensitivity, (2) controllability, and (3) measurement accuracy based on 315 observations
(only factor scores higher than 0.3 are shown)
Items Factor 1 Factor 2 Factor 3 Factor 4
My performance expressed in xxx performance measures is strongly affected by
a. …changes in economic conditions
b. …decisions made in other parts of the organization
c. …changes in the behavior of customers
d. …changes in the behavior or strategies of suppliers
e. …changes in the behavior or strategies of competitors
f. Whether I function well or not as a manager can be expressed accurately in xxx performance
g. Many of the activities and tasks that I perform do not show up in xxx performance
h. If I perform well as a manager, it is directly reflected in better xxx performance
i. Working hard leads to better xxx performance
j. Devotion and effort in my job leads to better xxx performance
k. Providing effort in my job leads to better xxx performance
l. The measurement of xxx performance is objective and verifiable
m. The measurement of xxx performance is done by objective persons
n. An independent person verifies the measurement of xxx performance
o. The measurement of xxx is predominantly of a quantitative nature
0.427
0.505
0.837
0.782
0.851
0.837
0.871
0.837
0.562
0.698
0.394
0.757
0.622
0.726
-0.349
-0.578
0.791
-0.734
Eigenvalue 3.42 2.34 2.05 1.09
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TABLE 3
Questionnaire items related to the measurement of the use of performance measures
for performance evaluation and compensation purposes
8 items using a five-point fully anchored scale (no importance – very high importance)
How much importance does your superior attach to xxx performance measures in
a. … the evaluation of your performance
b. … periodic performance-reports
c. … officially rating your performance
d. … periodic discussions with you
e. … determining your salary increases
f. … determining your annual bonus
g. … increasing your chance of promotion
h. … increasing your authority within the organization
35
TABLE 4
Paired sample t-test with respect to differences between the use of financial and
non-financial performance measures for groups of low and high reliance on
financial performance measures in the annual bonus contract
Relative reliance on financial performance measures
in annual bonus contract
Low High
Performance measure Mean use Difference Mean use Difference
Financial -0.375 0.388
-0.463*** 0.688***
Internal non-financial 0.088 -0.300
Financial -0.375 0.388
-0.331*** 0.565***
External non-financial -0.044 -0.177
Internal non-financial 0.088 -0.300
0.132 -0.123
External non-financial -0.044 -0.177
Notes:
***, **, *, † is significant at respectively the 1%, 2½%, 5%, and 10% level (one-tailed).
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TABLE 5
Descriptive statistics of variables used (n=105)
Variable Mean Standard deviation Actual range Cronbach alpha
Task uncertainty 0 0.60 -1.22 – 1.54 0.77
Environmental uncertainty 0 0.68 -3.32 – 1.48 0.59
Decision-making authority 0 0.71 -1.82 – 1.49 0.75
Sensitivity FPM 0 0.70 -1.73 – 1.83 0.73
Controllability FPM 0 0.61 -1.41 – 1.64 0.57
Measurement accuracy FPM 0 0.76 -1.98 – 1.34 0.75
Sensitivity INFPM 0 0.76 -2.14 – 1.68 0.81
Controllability INFPM 0 0.67 -1.43 – 1.98 0.70
Measurement accuracy INFPM 0 0.77 -1.75 – 2.05 0.77
Sensitivity ENFPM 0 0.78 -2.39 – 1.57 0.83
Controllability ENFPM 0 0.65 -1.56 – 1.91 0.65
Measurement accuracy ENFPM 0 0.77 -1.79 – 1.44 0.78
Use of FPM 0 0.74 -2.11 – 1.59 0.88
Use of INFPM 0 0.78 -2.31 – 1.56 0.91
Use of ENFPM 0 0.77 -2.32 – 1.49 0.90
Notes:
a FPM: financial performance measures
INFPM: internal non-financial performance measures
ENFPM: external non-financial performance measures
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TABLE 6
Empirical results of the effects of decision-making authority, sensitivity, controllability,
and measurement accuracy on the use of performance measures
Dependent Variable
Independent Variable
Use of
Financial
Performance
Measures
Use of
Internal
Non-financial
Performance
Measures
Use of
External
Non-financial
Performance
Measures
Decision-making Authority 0.16*           -0.09           -0.08
Sensitivitya 0.30*** 0.48*** 0.46***
Controllabilitya           -0.32***           -0.09           -0.09
Measurement Accuracya 0.16* 0.15*           -0.07
Squared Multiple Correlation 0.23 0.27 0.24
Notes:
***, **, *, † is significant at respectively the 1%, 2½%, 5%, and 10% level (one-tailed) using
coefficient estimates and standard errors generated from 500 random bootstrap samples
(with replacement).
a The performance measure characteristics relate to each type of performance measure.
b Parameters are maximum likelihood estimates.
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TABLE 7
Empirical results of the effect of task uncertainty on
the sensitivity of performance measures
Dependent Variable
Independent Variable
Sensitivity of
Financial
Performance
Measures
Sensitivity of
Internal
Non-financial
Performance
Measures
Sensitivity of
External
Non-financial
Performance
Measures
Task Uncertainty 0.24** 0.37***           -0.10
Squared Multiple Correlation 0.04 0.08 0.01
Notes:
***, **, *, † is significant at respectively the 1%, 2½%, 5%, and 10% level (one-tailed) using
coefficient estimates and standard errors generated from 500 random bootstrap samples
(with replacement).
a Parameters are maximum likelihood estimates.
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TABLE 8
Empirical results of the effect of environmental uncertainty on
the controllability of performance measures
Dependent Variable
Independent Variable
Controllability of
Financial
Performance
Measures
Controllability of
Internal
Non-financial
Performance
Measures
Controllability of
External
Non-financial
Performance
Measures
Environmental Uncertainty           -0.38***           -0.28***           -0.23***
Squared Multiple Correlation 0.18 0.08 0.06
Notes:
***, **, *, † is significant at respectively the 1%, 2½%, 5%, and 10% level (one-tailed) using
coefficient estimates and standard errors generated from 500 random bootstrap samples
(with replacement).
a Parameters are maximum likelihood estimates.
39
TABLE 9
Results of hypothesis testing
Relationship Hypothesis
Expected
sign
Path
coefficients Test results
DEC →  USE_FPM H1a + 0.16* Supported
DEC →  USE_INFPM H1b ?        - 0.09 Supported
DEC →  USE_ENFPM H1c ?        - 0.08 Supported
SENS_FPM →  USE_FPM H2ai + 0.30*** Supported
CON_FPM →  USE_FPM H2aii +        - 0.32*** Not supported
ACC_FPM →  USE_FPM H2aiii + 0.16* Supported
SENS_INFPM →  USE_INFPM H2bi + 0.48*** Supported
CON_INFPM →  USE_FPM H2bii +        - 0.09 Not supported
ACC_INFPM →  USE_INFPM H2biii + 0.15* Supported
SENS_ENFPM →  USE_ENFPM H2ci + 0.46*** Supported
CON_ENFPM →  USE_ENFPM H2cii +        - 0.09 Not supported
ACC_ENFPM →  USE_ENFPM H2ciii +        - 0.07 Not supported
TU →  SENS_FPM H3a + 0.24** Supported
TU →  SENS_INFPM H3b + 0.37*** Supported
TU →  SENS_ENFPM H3c ?        - 0.10 Supported
EU →  CON_FPM H4a −        - 0.38*** Supported
EU →  CON_INFPM H4b −        - 0.28*** Supported
EU →  CON_ENFPM H4c −        - 0.23*** Supported
Notes:
***, **, *, † is significant at respectively the 1%, 2½%, 5%, and 10% level (one-tailed) using
coefficient estimates and standard errors generated from 500 random bootstrap samples
(with replacement).
a Parameters are maximum likelihood estimates.
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FIGURE 1
Empirical model
Notes:
a EU = environmental uncertainty;
TU = task uncertainty;
DEC = decision-making authority;
CON= controllability of performance measures;
SEN = sensitivity of performance measures;
ACC = measurement accuracy of performance measures;
USE = use of performance measures.
CON
EU TU
DEC SEN ACC
USE
H4a-c H3
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FIGURE 2
Non-recursive model
Notes:
a EU = environmental uncertainty;
TU = task uncertainty;
DEC = decision-making authority;
CON= controllability of performance measures;
SEN = sensitivity of performance measures;
ACC = measurement accuracy of performance measures;
USE = use of performance measures.
CON
EU TU
DEC SEN ACC
USE
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Endnotes:
                                                
1 All examples presented with respect to each type of performance measure are measures actually used for
incentive purposes by the participating firms.
2 Hirst (1983), for example, measures ‘task uncertainty’ by combining scales that reflect both task uncertainty
and environmental uncertainty. Similarly, Brownell (1985) uses the functional area of managers to reflect
differences in both task uncertainty and environmental uncertainty.
3 The three studies are a (1) field study, (2) archival study, and (3) questionnaire study complemented with
archival data. To date these studies are still in progress.
4 The Hay-points are based on the Hay Guide Chart Profile Method, a system that compares the value of jobs
based on multiple factors such as accountability and know-how (Flannery et al. 1996, 20). A weight greater than
400 relates to higher-level personnel.
5 The archival data can be linked to the questionnaire data through codes. Each questionnaire contains a unique
code that is printed on the final page of the questionnaire. The HR manager of each firm provides the archival
data mentioning the codes in stead of the respondent’s name, which does not violate the anonymity principle.
6 In computing all constructs, I use unit-weighted average standardized scores because these have preferred
psychometric properties relative to regression estimates of factor scores (Grice and Harris 1998).
7 The scores for impact and predictability are such that higher scores for impact mean higher impact, while
higher scores for predictability mean lower predictability. The logic underlying the multiplication is that given
the impact of the attributes, increased unpredictability makes it more difficult to control for this impact, which
increases uncertainty.
8 Amos is short for Analysis of Moment Structures. Amos uses the general approach to data analysis known as
structural equation modeling (Arbuckle and Wothke 1999).
9 I also calculate full information maximum likelihood (FIML) estimates (Anderson 1957) using all 114
observations. The results (not reported) are identical to those presented in this paper.
10 Especially the unexpected significant negative relationship between controllability and the use of financial
performance measures might be due to an omitted variable problem. There is evidence that suggests that the use
of financial controls increases with uncertainty (e.g., Khandwalla 1972; Simons 1987) and uncertainty might
therefore be the omitted variable.
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11 This relationship is to some extent consistent with the predictions made by organization theory, which states
that organizations become more decentralized when the environment is more uncertain.
